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The Design of Airline Route Networks - Video học tiếng Anh
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The Design of Airline Route Networks
The Design of Airline Route Networks
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Legendas (711)
0:00
United, American, and Delta Airlines
0:02
offer almost exactly the same thing. Not
0:05
exactly, but almost. And they do this on
0:08
purpose. When one of them eliminates
0:10
change fees, they all eliminate change
0:11
fees. When one of them announces free
0:13
Wi-Fi, they all announce free Wi-Fi.
0:16
When one of them ups fees, they all up
0:18
bag fees. They each offer pretty much
0:21
the same leg room, pretty much the same
0:23
snacks, pretty much the same lounges
0:25
pretty much the same reliability.
0:27
Smaller airlines don't do this. They are
0:29
strategically motivated to differentiate
0:31
through offering a lowcost model like
0:33
with Spirit or a unique product like
0:35
JetBlue Mint. But the bigger US airlines
0:37
compete in one of the most textbook
0:39
examples of an oligopolistic industry.
0:41
And in igopolistic industries, there is
0:43
strategic incentive to converge on
0:45
product offering. If one player makes a
0:48
change, they all follow in suits that no
0:50
one of the three gains a meaningful
0:52
differentiation. It's also mutually
0:54
harmful for the three airlines to
0:55
compete via price. So they largely
0:58
don't. Tim allegedly use algorithms to
1:00
standardize fairs between each other. So
1:02
with disincentive to compete on both
1:04
product and price, that leaves one major
1:06
arena in which the three airlines can
1:08
compete. Network. Subtly, each of the
1:12
three largest US airlines has carved out
1:14
a small niche for themselves through the
1:15
nuances of the design of their route
1:17
networks. From a high level, they look
1:19
more or less equivalent. But by digging
1:21
in, one can see the subtle strategic
1:23
differences between the three. the ways
1:25
they attempt to claw out a competitive
1:27
edge against each other. For example
1:30
there's really only one airline among
1:32
the three that would fly this route
1:34
Anchorage, Alaska, to Washington DC. Of
1:37
course, that's in part because it ends
1:38
up in DC, a United hub, but it's not
1:41
about the literal start or end point of
1:43
this route, but rather the
1:44
characteristics of this connection. It's
1:47
sort of weak. Prior to launching this
1:50
route, United already operated flights
1:52
to the Last Frontier from each of its
1:54
mainland hubs, minus Los Angeles, and
1:56
that meant that they already flew
1:58
Chicago to Anchorage. Chicago is a
2:00
perfect connecting hub for passengers
2:02
headed from the East Coast to Alaska.
2:04
It's right on the way, and almost every
2:06
midsize or larger airport on the East
2:07
Coast is connected to Chicago via
2:09
United. DC, meanwhile, is not a good
2:12
connecting hub to Alaska. It's out of
2:15
the way from almost every airport and it
2:16
sits almost 3,400 miles or 5,500 km
2:20
away. That puts it towards the edge of
2:22
the range of the narrowbody 737 Max 8
2:24
assigned to the route. The closer a
2:26
flight gets to the limits of an
2:28
aircraft's range, the tougher the
2:29
economics tend to be due to potential
2:31
weight restrictions limiting seat sales
2:33
or cargo potential and the practical
2:35
fact that carrying more fuel for later
2:37
in the flight requires burning more fuel
2:38
to carry that fuel earlier in the
2:40
flight. as in overall fuel efficiency
2:42
gets worse towards the extremes of
2:44
range. So operating an anchorage flight
2:47
from DC offered worse economics, a worse
2:49
geographic connecting point and yet in
2:51
2024, United Airlines launched the
2:54
flight anyways. A 7 to 8 hour daily
2:56
non-stop operating throughout the summer
2:59
season. Now what United was likely
3:02
banking on, at least in part, was the
3:04
local market. The hope was that there
3:06
was a good number of DC area residents
3:08
and to a lesser extent Alaskans who were
3:10
willing to pay a fair premium for the
3:12
convenience of a non-stop. If there were
3:14
enough, it would offset the worse
3:16
economics of the flight. And there must
3:18
have been, as this flight is now backed
3:19
for the 2025 summer season as well. Now
3:22
a summer seasonal narrowbody domestic
3:24
flight might appear unremarkable, but
3:26
it's really a uniquely united route
3:28
based on the level of risk tolerance it
3:31
required to launch. American and Delta
3:33
tend to be conservative in their route
3:35
planning, whereas United believes in
3:37
their ability to induce demand through
3:38
offering more convenient connections.
3:41
United really competes on network depth.
3:43
Of the big three US airlines, it flies
3:45
the fewest daily flights and carries the
3:47
fewest annual passengers, yet serves the
3:49
highest number of destinations. They
3:52
spread their operations out and focus on
3:54
breadth versus depth. This sometimes
3:57
manifests quite objectively when United
3:58
flights to places American and Delta do
4:00
not. PBLA, Mexico, Farmington, New
4:02
Mexico, Laram, Wyoming, Devil's Lake
4:05
North Dakota. It also manifests through
4:06
year-round service to destinations their
4:08
competitors only fly seasonally.
4:10
Edinburgh Scotland Gunnison Colorado
4:12
Auckland, New Zealand. Each of these
4:14
three sees seasonal tourism surges yet
4:16
still have reasonable year-round demand.
4:19
United captures that year-round demand.
4:21
Delta and American compete for the
4:23
seasonal surge. United's network depth
4:25
takes its most extreme form outside
4:27
North America. American Airlines serves
4:29
26 different longhaul international
4:31
destinations, 18 of which are in Europe
4:33
leaving one flight to Qatar, one to
4:35
India, three to East Asia, two to
4:37
Australia, and one to New Zealand. Delta
4:39
flies to 41 long haul destinations, the
4:42
difference largely made up of additional
4:43
summer only flying to key markets in
4:45
Europe, plus a six destination Africa
4:47
market. United, meanwhile, flies to 58
4:50
different longhaul destinations. Much of
4:53
this is made up of depth in already
4:55
strong markets. Delta and American fly
4:56
to Tokyo, but United is the only to fly
4:58
to Osaka, a top destination for American
5:01
tourists in Japan and also a strong
5:03
origin market for USbound passengers. In
5:05
New Zealand, Delta and American both fly
5:07
to Auckland seasonally. Yet, United is
5:09
the only to fly non-stop from North
5:11
America to Christurch, the largest city
5:13
on the country's less populous but more
5:15
picturesque South Island. With a route
5:17
like this, the airline is banking on its
5:19
ability to induce demand. Patrick Quail
5:22
the United executive overseeing network
5:24
planning, has discussed in interviews
5:26
the difficulty in improving the
5:27
viability of a potential route like
5:28
Christurch through quantitative data.
5:31
When starting a route domestically, much
5:33
of the decision can be made by looking
5:34
at traffic pattern data that shows, say
5:36
that enough people are flying from DC to
5:38
Anchorage via connections that it's
5:40
worth launching a non-stop. But it's
5:42
unlikely that the numbers directly
5:44
demonstrated that for a relatively minor
5:46
longhaul market like Christurch because
5:48
tourists to New Zealand were
5:49
historically likely to book a ticket
5:51
just to Auckland. From there, some might
5:53
rent a car, some might stay for a few
5:55
days and book a separate ticket to
5:56
Christ Church. Some might even book a
5:58
ticket to a different South Island
5:59
airport like Queenstown. So, the theory
6:01
behind a route to Christurch went well
6:03
beyond just capturing the customers that
6:05
previously booked a connecting
6:06
itinerary, but rather to induce people
6:09
to form their plans around the
6:10
convenience of the flight and fly
6:12
straight to Christ Church. This is
6:14
certainly primarily a leisure flight.
6:16
There's not that much business demand to
6:18
Christurch and leisure travelers tend to
6:20
be fairly flexible with their plans.
6:22
United has had decent success in the
6:24
past at inducing demand on leisure
6:26
focused long hauls. Other examples would
6:27
be their flights to Tahiti or Cape Town.
6:30
So, in some ways, United's competitive
6:32
advantage centers around their risk
6:34
tolerance. Christurch didn't have the
6:36
data to prove it'd be profitable, but
6:38
the airlines subjectively considered it
6:40
worth a shot. If they're right, United
6:42
can essentially monopolize the market
6:44
before American, Delta, or another
6:46
competitor can enter. And recently
6:48
United has pushed to new extremes in
6:50
developing far-flung markets. It started
6:53
as a solution to a problem. You see
6:55
United has long operated a rather unique
6:58
small hub in the American territory of
7:00
Guam, a mere 3-hour flight from Tokyo
7:02
meaning they have crew and narrow-body
7:04
737 aircraft stationed on the far side
7:06
of the Pacific. Previously, the
7:08
financial motive behind such a far-flung
7:10
atypical hub was focused on capturing
7:12
the large inbound tourist market from
7:14
Japan to Guam. Since the COVID pandemic
7:16
though, the territo's tourism numbers
7:18
have fallen dramatically in part due to
7:20
the weak exchange rate between the yen
7:21
and the dollar, making vacations in the
7:23
US territory much more expensive for
7:25
Japanese people. Rather than
7:27
redistributing aircraft towards the
7:28
mainland and shrinking the hub, United
7:30
opted to use this excess capacity to
7:32
develop a deeper route network into
7:34
Asia. Specifically, they're turning
7:36
Tokyo Narita Airport into a mini hub
7:38
with new narrowbody routes to Cebu
7:40
Philippines, Koyong, Taiwan, and Ulan
7:42
Bach, Mongolia. These flights are each
7:44
operated using Guam based aircraft, yet
7:47
are time to leave Tokyo in the early
7:48
afternoon, providing quick connections
7:50
from the airlines inbound long haul
7:51
flights from the US, which all arrive
7:53
within a few hours of each other. Then
7:55
the 737s return from their destinations
7:57
the following morning to time with the
7:59
next day's USbound long haul bank. With
8:01
each of these routes, no United Partner
8:03
Airline operates a flight at a time that
8:05
allowed for same-day connections via
8:06
Tokyo, meaning passengers would often
8:08
have to overnight in Japan or more
8:10
realistically, fly with another airline.
8:12
Now, United is able to advertise the
8:14
fastest itinerary between the US and
8:16
these destinations, and they can likely
8:18
even win some additional customers
8:19
through offering an itinerary fully on
8:21
their own metal rather than on a foreign
8:23
airline US passengers might be
8:24
unfamiliar and apprehensive of. Even
8:27
though some of these routes have not yet
8:28
flown, the strategy must be proving
8:30
promising since the airline is already
8:32
doubling down on it with newlyannounced
8:33
routes from Hong Kong to both Bangkok
8:35
and Ho Chi Min City. Like the Tokyo
8:37
routes, these will be timed for an easy
8:39
connection to and from the airlines Hong
8:41
Kong long hauls. Yet, in this case
8:42
they're not being operated by a Guam
8:44
based aircraft. Rather, a valuable 787
8:47
that could otherwise be operating
8:48
lucrative long hauls. Really, the more
8:50
you dig into it, the more United's
8:52
international network design is
8:53
explained through the competitive
8:54
weaknesses of their partner networks.
8:57
Over in Europe, the most important long
8:58
haul market for US airlines, United has
9:00
a major transatlantic joint venture with
9:02
the Lutanza Group, meaning the airlines
9:04
have essentially formed a jointly owned
9:06
business and share revenue between all
9:07
their transatlantic operations. In
9:09
practice, this means they work together
9:11
to grow economies of scale by forming
9:13
networks that integrate together well so
9:14
that the joint venture is more
9:16
competitive overall. But there's a
9:18
problem. American's biggest
9:20
transatlantic partner is British Airways
9:22
in London, whereas Delta connects
9:23
passengers primarily through Paris and
9:25
Amsterdam via Air France and KLM. The
9:27
biggest Luansa Group hubs though are
9:29
Frankfurt, Munich, and Zurich, far
9:32
further into Europe when flying from the
9:34
US. that makes them less competitive
9:36
both costlier for the airline and more
9:38
timeconuming for the consumer. But it's
9:41
that very strategic shortfall that
9:42
explains this. The vast majority of
9:45
United's non-stop flights to Europe sit
9:47
to the southwest of the Luanza group's
9:49
primary hubs, as this is the area of
9:51
Europe least effectively served by them.
9:54
A United traveler headed from Denver to
9:56
Farro, Portugal, for example, would have
9:57
to sit through an almost 16-hour
9:59
itinerary when connecting through
10:00
Frankfurt onto Lufansza. Whereas with
10:02
the non-stop from Newark, they can fly
10:04
there in about 13 hours, the fastest
10:06
itinerary offered by any airline. While
10:09
it's certainly true that American
10:10
travelers are more likely to visit
10:12
Western Europe, explaining some of the
10:14
disproportionality, United has tried
10:16
routes to the north and east where the
10:17
Lufansza hubs would be more
10:18
comparatively competitive. They used to
10:20
fly to Hamburg, but that stopped in
10:22
2018. They used to fly to Prague, but
10:24
that stopped in 2019 after a single
10:26
disastrous summer. They used to fly to
10:27
Bergen, but that too lasted only for the
10:30
summer of 2022. But despite these few
10:32
stumbles, United's international
10:34
strategy appears remarkably effective.
10:36
In Tenneref, Farro, Malaga, Bulbao
10:39
Palma, De Bronik, and elsewhere, they've
10:41
proven the only airline, American or
10:43
otherwise, able to make the economics of
10:45
a transatlantic flight work, meaning
10:47
they have these markets cornered. And
10:49
increasingly this globality is expanding
10:51
to the Pacific as they're the only
10:53
airline offering trans-Pacific service
10:54
to Christurch and Adelaide and the only
10:56
US airline serving Bangkok, Ho Chi Min
10:59
City Cebu Manila Singapore Kasyang
11:01
Osaka, and Ulang Bau. This has set
11:04
United up for the current moment so well
11:06
as the strongest segment of US origin
11:08
travel in recent years has been longhaul
11:10
international leisure travel. And
11:12
certainly based on the recent growth of
11:14
this sector of their network, United has
11:15
found flying to far-flung destinations
11:17
worthwhile, expanding their ability to
11:19
capture more customers and charge more.
11:22
It's all so very different from the
11:24
strategy of American Airlines. They're
11:26
the US's second largest airline by
11:28
destination count, but by far the
11:30
largest in terms of passenger count.
11:32
This reflects the reality of their
11:34
network. Relative to United, they skew
11:36
more towards domestic focus and are less
11:38
likely to serve niche routes.
11:40
Internationally, they just do what they
11:42
need to. In fact, they've more or less
11:44
said this outright to their investors in
11:46
a 2024 presentation. Quote, "Our
11:48
Shorehole network is the foundation of
11:50
value for customers and investors." So
11:52
while they don't necessarily find much
11:54
reason to strongly compete
11:55
internationally, American does need to
11:57
offer some global connectivity to
11:59
meaningfully compete at all with United
12:01
and Delta. It's particularly important
12:03
for winning corporate contracts.
12:05
American Delta and United each compete
12:07
to sign deals with companies requiring
12:09
lots of business travel. Think McKenzie
12:11
Deote, Loheed Martin, Boeing, really any
12:14
large business with a dispersed
12:15
geographic footprint. These contracts
12:17
are predictable business and tend to
12:19
include plenty of lucrative premium
12:20
travel, making them hugely valuable for
12:22
airlines. Yet, in addition to price and
12:24
perks and terms, one of the major things
12:26
a potential client might look at is
12:28
global connectivity. Deote will be
12:30
looking at how easily their executive
12:32
from Dallas might be able to get to say
12:34
Stockholm. Americans answer to this more
12:37
than anything is London. London is a
12:40
fantastic European connecting hub
12:42
because it's geographically positioned
12:44
at the entry point to the continent
12:45
coming from America and it's home to
12:47
British Airways which offers a huge
12:49
network of well-timed connecting flights
12:51
into the continent. British Airways is
12:53
American's joint venture partner
12:54
exclusively, making London a perfect way
12:57
for American airlines to serve Europe
12:58
without having to take on all the risk
13:00
and capital cost of developing a big
13:02
network into the continent. It might not
13:04
often be competitive to United's
13:05
non-stops, but it gets the job done. For
13:08
this reason, American flies a colossal
13:10
quantity of flights to Heathrow. Twice
13:12
daily from LA, once from Phoenix, five
13:14
times from Dallas, three from Chicago
13:16
two from Miami, three from Charlotte
13:18
two from Philadelphia, and four times
13:20
from New York. Those are all of
13:21
America's international hubs, but they
13:23
even fly daily Heathro flights from two
13:25
non-hub airports, Rally and Boston.
13:27
That's 24 daily flights overall
13:30
providing almost 7,000 daily seats. With
13:33
69 daily transatlantic frequencies
13:35
overall in the summer, that means more
13:37
than a third of American's European
13:39
capacity is dedicated exclusively to
13:41
Heathrow. And the proportions are even
13:43
more stark during the leaner winter
13:44
schedule. And this makes perfect sense.
13:47
In fact, American hardly has another
13:48
option. They retired a huge portion of
13:50
their long haul fleet during CO now
13:52
widely considered a strategic blender
13:54
and production backups at Boeing and
13:56
Airbus make for long timelines to
13:57
acquire new aircraft. So with the
13:59
limited wide bodies they have they focus
14:01
their fleet onto the place with the most
14:03
onward connectivity. Then beyond London
14:06
they focus on the biggest hits. Not a
14:09
single one of their European
14:11
destinations does not also receive
14:12
flights from either United or Delta.
14:15
They're not trying to compete on
14:16
convenience. They're trying to minimize
14:17
their costs, their risk, and focus on
14:20
what they're good at, short hall. An
14:22
American is very, very good at competing
14:25
on short hall, in part just thanks to
14:27
luck. Business came to them. This slide
14:30
from their investor presentation
14:31
explains it best. The blue dots
14:33
represent airports where American is
14:35
dominant, at least based on their own
14:36
analysis, either through offering the
14:38
most destinations or flight frequencies
14:40
compared to their competitors. This
14:42
shows that the region of the US where
14:43
American really most consistently excels
14:46
is the sunb belt. Arizona, Texas, and
14:48
Florida are some of the fastest growing
14:50
states in America. And in each, along
14:52
with much of the rest of the sunb belt
14:54
American is the dominant airline.
14:57
American itself admits to investors that
14:59
it strategy is centered around cornering
15:01
the market in certain cities
15:02
particularly in the sunb belt. In its
15:04
presentation, it brings up the example
15:06
of El Paso. Delta barely competes there
15:08
flying just to Atlanta. United does a
15:11
little more, flying to Denver, Chicago
15:12
and Houston, but each of these hubs is
15:14
fairly far and not in the orientation of
15:16
the biggest passenger flows. There are
15:18
not many big destinations to the
15:20
southeast, northeast, or north.
15:22
American, meanwhile, flies to its hubs
15:24
in Los Angeles, Chicago, and crucially
15:27
Phoenix, and Dallas. Each of this pair
15:30
is nearby and on the orientation of the
15:33
largest east-west passenger flows. The
15:35
difference between flying from El Paso
15:37
to San Francisco via Phoenix versus
15:39
Denver might seem minor at first, but it
15:41
represents the difference between a 6-h
15:43
hour and 4 and a half hour itinerary
15:45
which can absolutely be the deciding
15:47
factor for passengers. And it also means
15:49
that Americans operating cost for the
15:50
itinerary will be lower given fewer
15:52
flown miles. Since airlines often
15:54
converge on price using algorithmic
15:56
collusion, this will mean on average
15:58
Americans profit margins on this segment
16:00
will also be higher. The compounding
16:02
effect of these well-located southern
16:04
hubs really adds up. So for cities like
16:06
El Paso, American asserts competitive
16:08
dominance by offering the largest amount
16:10
of capacity in the market, providing
16:12
four daily flights to Phoenix, three to
16:13
LA, nine to Dallas, and two to Chicago.
16:16
This is in stark comparison to say
16:18
Boise. American just doesn't have the
16:21
hubs to meaningfully compete in the
16:22
northern capital, so it doesn't bother.
16:24
It flies there from Phoenix, Dallas, and
16:26
Chicago with a total of eight daily
16:28
flights in the summer, providing
16:29
connectivity for its loyal customers
16:31
but not sinking resources into trying to
16:33
be the dominant carrier in a place where
16:34
it would struggle to win against United
16:36
and Delta's footprint given their Denver
16:38
and Salt Lake City hubs. Now, all
16:40
airlines do this to some extent
16:42
devoting a ton of capacity towards
16:44
markets where they believe they can win
16:45
thanks to geography and limiting
16:47
capacity towards less geographically
16:48
advantageous markets. American just
16:50
makes it a more overt and aggressive
16:52
component of their strategy. They have
16:54
found that through sheer scale, they can
16:56
dominate midsize markets like
16:58
Albuquerque or Oklahoma City or Memphis
17:00
making American Airlines the clear
17:02
choice, especially for the outbound
17:04
markets since they offer more departures
17:05
on more efficient routings from much of
17:07
the Sunb Belt to much of the rest of the
17:09
world. American also extends this
17:11
strategy south into Latin America given
17:13
the advantages of their Los Angeles
17:15
Phoenix, Dallas, and Miami hubs. They're
17:17
each geographically suited for the north
17:19
south crossber flows and located in
17:21
regions of the US with high Latin
17:22
American populations. American operates
17:24
to 29 different airports in Mexico for
17:27
example. United meaningfully competes
17:30
with 22 destinations in the country. It
17:32
does have a well-located hub in Houston
17:33
after all, but Delta really only focuses
17:35
on the major tourist destinations with
17:37
nine Mexican airports served. Pretty
17:40
much the same can be said of the
17:41
Caribbean. With 28 different relatively
17:43
small independent states and
17:44
territories, there is no major dominant
17:46
region specific airline. There are minor
17:48
ones like Caribbean Airlines, but
17:50
American Airlines manages to rank as the
17:52
Caribbean's largest airline overall
17:54
despite not even being based in the
17:56
region. Once again, just dominating a
17:58
regional market through sheer scale
18:00
thanks to its perfect Miami hub. Of
18:03
course, then there's Delta.
18:05
Strategically, Delta's network sits
18:07
somewhere between Americans and United.
18:09
Well, of course, one airline has to sit
18:11
in the middle of this spectrum. There's
18:12
a good reason it's Delta. Delta does not
18:14
consider its network as core to its
18:17
strategic advantage. In fact, in their
18:19
2024 investor day presentation, they
18:21
didn't even mention their network. They
18:23
relegated the two slides about it to the
18:24
appendix. Much of their presentation
18:26
focused on what the company believes is
18:28
their competitive advantage, their
18:30
brand. Delta considers itself a premium
18:33
airline, offering a differentiated
18:35
elevated experience compared to United
18:37
and American. In prior years, the
18:39
airline experimented with more concrete
18:41
notable differences such as an elevated
18:42
long haul economy experience where a
18:44
passenger received a welcome cocktail
18:45
and hot towel after takeoff, the
18:47
selection of both appetizers and main
18:49
courses, chocolates handed out before
18:50
landing, and more. But these went away
18:52
and never came back postco. This
18:55
indicates that Delta must not have seen
18:56
enough of a revenue impact to justify
18:58
the additional operating cost. And the
19:00
industry's oligopolistic tendencies once
19:02
again incentivized product convergence.
19:04
These days, Delta Economy class lacks
19:07
major objective differentiation in terms
19:09
of onboard experience compared to United
19:10
and American. It's a bit ahead of the
19:12
curve on rolling out free Wi-Fi. Much of
19:14
its fleet has been refurbished in recent
19:16
years, but its primary objective product
19:18
differentiation is a consistently high
19:20
on time rating, higher than United
19:22
Americans year in year out. Customers
19:25
also often anecdotally report better
19:27
service. But how objectively
19:29
differentiated Delta is doesn't matter
19:31
much, at least in the short term
19:33
because customers clearly believe it is.
19:35
In recent years, it has tended to beat
19:37
United and American in profitability. As
19:39
it points out to its investors, Delta is
19:41
able to command a revenue premium thanks
19:42
to its brand, its product, its loyalty
19:45
program, its credit cards, but not as
19:47
much as network. Delta's network is
19:49
costefficient, serving its own purposes
19:51
but it's not necessarily the most
19:53
competitive in capturing customers. They
19:55
less often offer the fastest itinerary
19:57
and they are firmly America's third
19:59
largest airline by destination count.
20:02
Their network is not as vast as United's
20:04
nor geographically efficient as
20:06
Americans. For example, Salt Lake City
20:08
is a good hub for sure, but United's in
20:10
Denver is better. Denver has a larger
20:12
local market boosting the economics and
20:14
the airport is also located far outside
20:16
the city with nearly limitless room for
20:18
expansion whereas Salt Lake City airport
20:20
has limited opportunity for growth both
20:21
given the configuration of the mountains
20:23
around and the fact that the area
20:24
surrounding the airport is already built
20:26
up and perhaps most crucially Salt Lake
20:29
City is just not as good of a geographic
20:31
position. Denver is a perfect location
20:33
for serving the large east west
20:35
passenger flows to smaller mountain west
20:37
destinations. And therefore, United has
20:39
a dominant market position into high
20:41
yield destinations like Tellyide, Aspen
20:43
and Jackson along with market dominance
20:45
in small destinations like Durango
20:47
Grand Junction, or Casper. Despite their
20:49
nearby hub, Delta barely even competes
20:51
in this region, offering connectivity to
20:53
major destinations, but hardly
20:55
attempting to maintain a dominant
20:57
position in much of the Mountain West.
20:59
It's a similar story with many of the
21:00
rest of their hubs. Seattle is weaker
21:02
than San Francisco. It's a smaller local
21:04
market. It sees heavy competition from
21:06
Alaska Airlines. Perhaps the only
21:08
benefit is it's slightly better
21:09
geographically suited as a trans-pacific
21:11
hub. Minneapolis and Detroit both serve
21:13
roles better served by Chicago than
21:15
Delta just competes directly with
21:16
American and United in New York and LA.
21:18
And direct competition almost always
21:20
leads to worse economics. Atlanta
21:23
though, that's an exception. It is truly
21:25
the crown jewel of Delta's network. is a
21:28
dream location for an airline hub. It's
21:31
perfectly located to capture massive
21:33
north south passenger flows. A ton of
21:35
people live in the Northeast. A ton of
21:37
people visit Florida, the Caribbean, and
21:39
Mexico. And yet, Atlanta's far enough
21:41
west to be competitive for east west
21:43
traffic, offering itineraries
21:44
competitive with Americans through
21:46
Dallas to much of the western half of
21:47
the US. And then it sits in the center
21:49
of the American South, really the sole
21:51
large region that the airline is able to
21:53
just simply dominate in terms of
21:55
connectivity. By and large, Delta
21:57
strength is in their cost management and
21:59
brand loyalty. They can be riskaverse
22:01
and yet still effectively capture
22:03
customers. Meanwhile, American and
22:06
United do more of the endless work of
22:08
continuously tweaking their networks to
22:09
best serve every single configuration of
22:12
every single route to, from, and between
22:15
each and every US airport.
22:18
One rather concerning thing about living
22:20
in America is that there are rather weak
22:23
data privacy laws and a whole lot of
22:25
personal data that is put out into the
22:27
public record, often by governments
22:29
themselves. This wasn't a huge problem
22:31
before the internet, but nowadays it
22:32
means that people can turn a profit off
22:34
of making it easier for people to get
22:36
your personal info. And they do. It's
22:38
called people search sites. Just search
22:41
your name and address or phone number
22:43
and you'll probably come across a whole
22:44
lot of sites that have at least some of
22:46
your personal info. But you do have the
22:49
power to change that. You have the right
22:50
to request your data removed from each
22:52
and every one of these sites. The
22:54
problem is it takes forever to do that.
22:57
They make it as hard as possible and you
22:59
have to do it for every one of the
23:01
endless sites that have it. But that's a
23:03
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