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US Plan for Venezuela EXPLAINED
US Plan for Venezuela EXPLAINED
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Subtitles (165)
0:00
Following the capture of Nicolas Maduro, President Donald Trump has claimed that
0:03
the United States is now in charge of Venezuela. But what does that actually mean and what does
0:08
the future hold for the South American nation? The raid on Maduro’s compound by U.S. special
0:13
forces caught the Venezuelan President - and the world - off guard. The entire operation was over
0:18
in just 2 hours 20 minutes with air strikes on military sites surrounding Carracas. The US had
0:24
just pulled off the most daring raid in modern military history- the question remains, now what?
0:29
When the White House says the United States is ‘in charge’, it doesn’t mean legal ownership,
0:34
occupation or annexation. Instead, there’s a belief that Washington has leverage over
0:39
Venezuela’s political direction, economic assets and ties with other countries without actually
0:44
taking responsibility for governing the country. In practical terms, the United States controls
0:48
access to Venezuela’s frozen overseas assets and influences which oil licenses
0:53
are granted or revoked. It also determines which political actors receive diplomatic recognition,
0:58
and shapes the country’s access to international financial institutions. Intelligence cooperation,
1:03
security coordination, and the threat of renewed force all reinforce that position. None of these
1:09
tools require formal governance, but added together, they allow Washington to restrict
1:13
Venezuela’s choices while steering outcomes in directions favorable to U.S. interests.
1:18
And this matters. Formal control carries legal and financial
1:22
obligations. Under international law, an occupying power is responsible for security, humanitarian
1:28
aid, and civilian governance. By avoiding this, the U.S. is able to keep its options open while
1:33
reducing its liabilities. And this is deliberate. It allows the administration to project dominance
1:38
without triggering all the responsibilities that come with it. That same ambiguity serves a
1:43
domestic political purpose too. Saying the U.S. is in control without calling it an occupation avoids
1:49
congressional debates and public backlash. And this isn’t a new approach.
1:54
The United States has relied on this approach before. In Panama after Noriega,
1:58
in Haiti during repeated interventions, and in the early stages of Iraq, Washington exerted
2:04
overwhelming influence without answering questions of legitimacy or long-term responsibility.
2:08
President Trump is following that pattern: it shows power while keeping room to disengage
2:13
or shift responsibility things deteriorate. Based on official statements, the U.S. approach
2:18
appears to involve removing hostile leadership, controlling access to strategic assets, preventing
2:23
rivals from gaining a foothold, and avoiding any formal commitment to long-term governance.
2:28
While no formal roadmap has been released, the likely sequence is increasingly visible.
2:32
First comes security consolidation: neutralizing remaining loyalist units,
2:36
securing key infrastructure, and preventing bad actors from exploiting the situation. Second
2:41
is economic stabilization, centered on oil production, currency controls, and selective
2:46
sanctions relief tied to compliance. Third is political management, whether through backing
2:51
a transitional authority, exerting oversight over existing institutions, or discreetly shaping the
2:56
make-up of a post-Maduro government. So, the question remains, now what?
3:01
First is the immediate aftermath. Even before Venezuela's future is considered, the reaction
3:05
from China and Russia has to be evaluated. Both nations were humiliated by the Maduro raid.
3:11
Venezuela was using the same radars China plans on using to counter any aerial threat in the Pacific.
3:15
Russia has suffered a similar significant public opinion defeat. It was responsible for building
3:20
Venezuela's layered air defense system. The capital was supposed to be a fortress designed
3:25
to inflict a significant toll on any attempts by the US to carry out air strikes. Instead,
3:30
it completely failed to defeat a helicopter raid - arguably the easiest of air targets
3:35
to hit - and was completely neutralized before firing a single shot. The operation was not just
3:40
about Venezuela, but about demonstrating capability to any enemy watching on.
3:44
How lasting that deterrent effect is remains unclear.
3:48
Demonstrating capability does not change long-term behavior. China and Russia might
3:52
change how they operate and how visible they are in the region. But both nations are unlikely to
3:57
abandon broader strategic goals based solely on Maduro’s capture. Deterrence depends on
4:02
consistency and follow-through, both of which are still uncertain in Venezuela.
4:06
China is fully expected to launch an invasion of Taiwan within the next few years, putting it
4:10
into direct confrontation with the United States as it comes to the island democracy's defense.
4:15
The raid on Caracas was a significant deterrent to a military that will face the full might of
4:20
US air power, though some critics argue that the raid only has partial value. After all,
4:24
this was a raid, carried out by specialized aircraft and with the US's most cutting edge,
4:29
reverse-engineered UFO technology weapons. It was not a full-blown conventional conflict,
4:34
and the type of assets the US used in Caracas are by their nature, limited. As has been noted,
4:39
the gap between US elite forces and Chinese elite forces is significantly
4:43
larger than the gap between US conventional forces and Chinese conventional forces.
4:48
But as China prepares to invade Taiwan, it has to consider one undeniable fact- its
4:53
sensors completely failed to detect a major US strike before being destroyed. Confidence
4:58
in its own capabilities is no doubt shaken in the wake of the highly successful Maduro raid.
5:04
As far as Russia, its response can best be gauged by its response to the recent
5:08
seizure by US forces of two Russian shadow fleet tankers in early January 2026. The
5:14
only action over was a diplomatic protest, and yet another strike inside of Ukraine.
5:18
The question of what happens next in Venezuela also revolves around these two nations. As usual,
5:23
the White House has not provided a plan for a post-Maduro Venezuela.
5:27
Will Venezuela turn into another Iraq? So far, the absence of a public roadmap
5:31
suggests that ambiguity itself may be the policy, even if it carries serious risks.
5:36
So far, the only indication of the future is a refusal to back the popular opposition candidate,
5:41
Edmundo Gonzalez Urrutia, from Venezuela’s last election - the person widely considered to have
5:47
won. Supporting Gonzalez Urrutia could prevent a civil war or insurgency that would cripple U.S.
5:52
interests as Washington rebuilds Venezuela’s oil sector. But this has been refused - reportedly
5:58
because Gonzalez Urrutia’s running mate, Maria Corina Machado, won the Nobel Peace Prize.
6:03
Instead, the U.S. appears to have indicated it will work with Maduro's vice president,
6:07
Delcy Rodriguez,or implement its own oversight of the Venezuelan government.
6:11
And these carry different risks. Backing Gonzalez Urrutia offers
6:15
legitimacy but limits U.S. control. Working with Delcy Rodriguez maintains continuity but risks
6:21
strengthening the networks that sustained Maduro’s rule. By refusing to commit publicly, Washington
6:26
retains flexibility - but at the cost of clarity. When authority is split and no one’s clearly
6:31
in charge, people stall and push back instead of working together.
6:34
And this creates problems inside Venezuela itself. Political figures, business leaders, and military
6:39
officers are less focused on whether the U.S. can act than on whether it will stay engaged. Without
6:45
a clear signal of long-term commitment, many are incentivized to hedge their bets, protect existing
6:50
power networks, or prepare exit strategies rather than support a stable transition. Historically,
6:55
this kind of uncertainty tends to prolong instability instead of resolving it.
6:59
Partial control can also be disruptive. It can increase the likelihood that bad actors - armed
7:04
groups, criminal organizations, or regional power brokers - fill the gaps left behind.
7:08
This would directly undermine stated U.S. goals while increasing pressure for deeper involvement.
7:13
Officially, the U.S. removal of Maduro was related to the
7:17
drug trade. But there might be another reason. Venezuela has little to do with the Fentanyl that
7:22
is trafficked into the U.S., which is handled by cartels in nations like Mexico. Overall,
7:26
Venezuelan drug flow into the U.S. is a small portion of a literal
7:30
firehose of drugs demanded by US consumers. Venezuela's oil constitutionally belongs to
7:35
Venezuela. In 2007, the former president, Hugo Chavez, nationalized the country's oil industry,
7:41
forcing US companies to leave the nation. This led to a seizure of Exxon Mobil and
7:45
ConocoPhillips infrastructure and assets. The company tried to recoup the value of these
7:50
assets via international court - even winning a World Bank arbitration over it. Chavez had
7:54
offered a deal to foreign oil companies - sell majority ownership of stakes in the country
7:58
to the Venezuelan government, or get out. Companies like Chevron, Norway's Statoil,
8:04
and France's Total signed new deals, making them 'technical advisors' and minority owners
8:09
in their own enterprises inside the country, but Exxon and ConocoPhillips failed to strike a deal.
8:14
All in all, Venezuela owes up to $32 billion to foreign oil companies, and President Trump has
8:20
made it clear U.S. companies will recoup those losses. With 303 billion barrels of reserves,
8:25
the nation's reserves are the largest in the world, about 17% of the total global supply.
8:30
And Venezuela's oil industry is badly in need of foreign assistance.
8:34
Under Chavez and then Maduro, the nation's oil sector has significantly deteriorated,
8:39
largely thanks to a lack of foreign technical expertise and investment. Despite sitting on
8:43
a vast fortune of oil which could raise the standard of living for the entire country,
8:48
Venezuela has continued to mismanage and underfund its oil industry. The output has dropped 800,000
8:53
to 1 million barrels a day from three times that much in the early 2000s before Chavez.
8:58
Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said that the US will export up to 50 million barrels of oil,
9:03
with government revenues used in a way that will benefit the Venezuelan people.
9:07
Even in best-case scenarios, economic recovery would lag far behind political expectations.
9:13
There is also a timing issue. Even under favorable conditions, restoring Venezuela’s oil production
9:17
to earlier levels will take years. Facilities need repairs, skilled workers have to be lured back,
9:23
contracts need to be renegotiated, and trust with partners has to be rebuilt. During that period,
9:28
expectations may rise faster than results, creating political tension before any
9:32
real benefits are felt. For the United States,
9:35
this creates a massive risk. There’s the risk of being blamed for
9:38
outcomes it can’t control. Once Washington presents itself as “in charge,” it becomes
9:43
connected with results on the ground - regardless of how indirect its actual role actually is.
9:48
Even a successful recovery in oil won’t fix Venezuela’s broader economic collapse.
9:53
Infrastructure across the country is poor, public services are weak,
9:56
and corruption remains widespread. Without deeper reforms and long-term stability, oil revenue
10:01
alone threatens to reinforce the same systems that led to the collapse in the first place.
10:06
There are also narrower, more immediate upsides for Washington.
10:10
Stabilizing Venezuela reduces migration pressure throughout the region and weakens criminal gangs.
10:15
It restores U.S. influence in a country that has resisted American influence, and reinforces
10:19
the precedent that pushing back on U.S. strategic red lines comes with consequences. These benefits
10:24
exist even if Venezuela never fully recovers. But look deeper and America's move has little
10:30
to do with Venezuela itself - or even its oil. It’s to protect itself. Specifically from China.
10:36
China's DF-21, DF-17, and DF-26 missiles all sport ranges of over 1,300 miles (2,092 km),
10:42
and this puts them in striking range of US oil infrastructure in the Gulf of Mexico if fired
10:46
from Venezuela. Chinese aircraft meanwhile could target the entire American gulf coast's energy
10:51
infrastructure with long-range weapons from air fields in the country. With just a few sorties,
10:55
China could cripple US energy. And that's what Venezuela is
10:59
really about - war with China. Venezuela and China have enjoyed
11:03
increasingly close relations as China seeks to penetrate into America's political hold over the
11:08
western hemisphere. The deployment of Chinese air defense radars was a major provocation,
11:12
and seen by military analysts as a direct defiance of America's Monroe Doctrine - a
11:17
national security strategy enacted in the mid 19th century. Named after President James Monroe,
11:22
it basically stated that the old world and the new world were to remain completely independent
11:26
spheres of influence. In other words, the US would not tolerate any European power in its
11:31
own hemisphere - a matter of national survival for a nation which was still struggling to hit
11:36
its stride against far greater European powers. In the Cold War, the Monroe doctrine was aimed
11:41
at keeping Soviet influence, and thus military equipment, out of range of US targets. The Cuban
11:46
missile crisis was an inflection point for the US, which saw its domestic security threatened
11:51
for the first time. Since then, the US has had zero tolerance for any further military
11:55
threats against the homeland - making the expansion of Chinese political power into
11:59
South America a direct affront. Venezuela's ever closer ties with
12:03
China were a direct threat to the U.S. as it prepares for war with China in the Pacific.
12:08
If this strategy succeeds, the United States gains strategic depth,
12:11
energy security, and restricts access to a major rival without assuming formal control.
12:16
Washington’s claim reflects how power is now exercised.
12:19
Control is less about formal rule and more about access,
12:23
denial, and leverage. Venezuela is not being governed by the United States,
12:27
but it is being constrained by U.S. decisions. Whether those constraints lead to stability or
12:32
simply delay further collapse will depend on choices that have not yet been made.
12:36
Being “in charge” does not remove risk. It just shifts responsibility without
12:41
guaranteeing control. The deeper the United States becomes involved, the more it will be
12:45
judged by outcomes it cannot fully control. That gap between power and responsibility
12:49
is where the future of Venezuela - and U.S. policy toward it - will be decided.
12:54
Now go watch What Actually Went Wrong With Venezuela or click on this video instead.
