Home
로그인
회원가입
Loading...
The Problem With Spirit Airlines’ Business Model - Video học tiếng Anh
듣기 연습
듣기 연습
/
Video
/
Wendover Productions
/
The Problem With Spirit Airlines’ Business Model
The Problem With Spirit Airlines’ Business Model
학습 모드 선택:
자막 보기
단어 선택
단어 다시 쓰기
Highlight:
3000 Oxford Words
4000 IELTS Words
5000 Oxford Words
3000 Common Words
1000 TOEIC Words
5000 TOEFL Words
자막 (661)
0:00
At its best and biggest, Spirit Airlines
0:03
was the worst. The same year it was
0:05
hailed as one of the fastest growing US
0:07
domestic carriers after introducing
0:09
seven new A320s to its fleet, adding
0:11
17.9% more available seat miles, and
0:14
opening over 20 new non-stop routes,
0:16
Spirit also made news for how frequently
0:19
people complained about it. Here's the
0:21
frequency with which other carriers
0:23
received complaints over cancellations,
0:25
delays, and other flight issues over a
0:27
four-year period, and here's the
0:28
frequency of complaints at Spirit,
0:31
tripling most and trending upward. A
0:34
decade later, little had changed. The
0:36
airline had risen to the seventh largest
0:38
North American carrier by total
0:39
passengers, while also coming in second
0:41
to last in J.D. Power's customer
0:43
satisfaction ratings. But just a few
0:45
years after that, with the arrival of
0:47
flight NK1833 at Dallas/Fort Worth in
0:50
the early hours of May 2nd, 2026, the
0:53
carrier was now gone entirely. And
0:56
rather than celebrate the end of an
0:58
airline that nickel-and-dimed you on
1:00
everything, that delayed and ran late
1:02
often, that offered a generally
1:04
unpleasant flying experience, its end
1:06
was met with a sort of melancholy
1:09
nostalgia. Effectively, a final proof
1:11
that while the product wasn't pretty, it
1:13
was effective in filling a previously
1:16
unserved corner of the market. And
1:19
though easy to conflate the carrier's
1:20
collapse with its ultra-cheap approach,
1:22
the reality is that Spirit found a niche
1:25
with its ultra-low-cost model rest
1:27
hadn't quite recognized, but would
1:29
eventually race to catch up to.
1:31
With a fleet maxing out at over 200
1:33
planes and nearly 20,000 employees,
1:36
Spirit momentarily mastered its niche,
1:39
the ultra-low-cost, entirely unbundled
1:42
domestic leisure market, but this took
1:44
decades to refine. From the start,
1:46
Spirit wasn't for the business traveler,
1:48
it wasn't for the wealthy, it was for
1:51
budget-conscious leisure travelers. Born
1:53
out of a trucking company that had begun
1:55
to dip its toes into air shipping,
1:57
Spirit began in 1983 as Charter One.
2:00
Rather than actually operating its own
2:02
flights, the company was more so a tour
2:04
operator coordinating gambling
2:05
itineraries first from Detroit, Boston,
2:07
and Providence to Atlantic City, then
2:09
eventually the Bahamas and Las Vegas. A
2:12
decade in, these leisure services had
2:14
proved popular enough to justify
2:15
expansion of both the fleet and [music]
2:18
the routings. Filing with the Department
2:20
of Transportation in 1992 to run
2:22
scheduled [music] passenger services, a
2:24
new budget-friendly leisure carrier was
2:26
born. Rather than keeping its Convair
2:29
580 turboprops going, the carrier
2:31
acquired 13 DC-9s and renamed itself
2:34
Spirit Airlines. From just three routes
2:36
in 1992, the service quickly expanded.
2:39
By 1996, the network looked like this,
2:41
still based out of Detroit and running a
2:43
lot of popular domestic budget-friendly
2:46
leisure routes from the Northeast and
2:47
Midwest now to Florida and Myrtle Beach
2:49
alongside Atlantic City. As the airline
2:52
grew through the decade, this
2:53
north-south vacation destination
2:55
orientation largely remained along with
2:57
an addition of a Detroit-to-LA route in
2:59
1999 and the company's first true
3:01
international route with a service from
3:03
Fort Lauderdale to Cancun, Mexico.
3:06
Through the '90s, Spirit established
3:07
itself as a bonafide low-cost carrier.
3:10
The planes, first DC-9s, then briefly
3:13
larger MD-80s towards the end of the
3:14
decade, were neither new nor especially
3:17
amenity-laden. The service, punctuated
3:19
by a 1994 mistake that saw the company
3:21
unintentionally overbook 1,400 tickets,
3:24
was going to be hit or miss sometimes.
3:26
But ultimately, the tickets were going
3:27
to be comparatively cheap and you still
3:29
get a drink, a snack, a checked bag, and
3:32
your choice of seat. It was budget, but
3:34
budget in the same way that Southwest
3:36
was budget.
3:38
This wasn't working. In 1999, Spirit
3:40
sued Northwest Airlines in what would
3:42
become an instructive moment for the
3:44
company. They alleged that Northwest, a
3:46
legacy airline, had slashed their prices
3:49
out of Detroit and flooded the market
3:50
with tickets in an effort to push Spirit
3:53
out. Spirit would eventually settle with
3:55
Northwest, but Northwest argued that it
3:56
maintained profitability along those
3:58
routes throughout the period.
4:00
Ultimately, the strategy would help push
4:01
Spirit to relocate its headquarters to
4:03
Fort Lauderdale, but it pointed at an
4:05
issue that was increasingly beginning to
4:07
cost the company at the turn of the
4:08
century. It just wasn't quite cheap
4:11
enough to compete with legacy carriers'
4:13
cheapest options. In the early 2000s,
4:16
the company was now losing money. It was
4:18
floundering and it needed a shot in the
4:21
arm.
4:22
The transformation from cheap to
4:23
cheapest started with the 2005
4:25
appointment of Ben Baldanza as
4:27
president, who had lamented the lack of
4:29
a true European-style ultra-low-cost
4:31
carrier in the US. Baldanza gained an
4:34
all-important ally when private equity
4:36
firm Indigo Partner bought a controlling
4:38
stake in [music] Spirit a year later.
4:39
Having global experience with and an
4:41
interest in ultra-low-cost carriers,
4:43
>> [music]
4:43
>> the new controlling owner, along with
4:45
the company's new leader, went all in on
4:48
ultra-cheap. They called this strategy
4:50
unbundling. The idea that the listed
4:52
price of a flight would guarantee
4:54
nothing more than a spot somewhere on
4:56
the plane. A concept simple enough, but
4:58
one that would have to be introduced
5:00
incrementally. First, in 2007, that
5:02
meant a $10 fee for a second checked
5:05
bag, then no complimentary food or
5:07
drinks, then no free seat selection.
5:09
You'd have to pay for that. The
5:11
following year, there was now a fee for
5:13
a first checked bag, then even a fee to
5:15
print a boarding pass. Next, in 2010,
5:18
the company announced an industry
5:19
[music] first, a $45 fee for overhead
5:22
storage of carry-on items. Even Ryanair
5:25
hadn't tried such a fee yet, and the
5:27
policy created such an uproar that US
5:29
senators introduced a bill to stop it.
5:32
The airline was now well on its way to
5:34
the worst, but it was offering fares so
5:37
outrageously low that, while it was easy
5:39
to complain about the product, for the
5:41
cash-strapped college kid looking to get
5:42
south for spring break, you just
5:44
couldn't argue with the prices. At the
5:47
same time Spirit normalized unbundled
5:49
airfare to the American traveler, it was
5:51
overhauling its fleet to exclusively use
5:52
Airbus A320s as it streamlined
5:55
maintenance and maximize [music] seats
5:56
per plane. In 2011, having found its
5:59
niche and gone all in, Spirit went
6:01
public. That same year it garnered more
6:04
than 30% of its total revenue from fees.
6:07
While the morals of it all may have felt
6:09
questionable, the results were
6:10
undeniable as total passengers ballooned
6:13
from under 7 million in 2010 to almost
6:16
34 million in 2019 while the company
6:18
turned a profit each of those years. The
6:21
company was unapologetic but upfront
6:23
about its pricing model. Its ads were
6:25
aggressively targeted to young budget
6:27
travelers and its network was expanding.
6:30
At the end of the decade, the company
6:31
reached its peak. It offered about the
6:33
worst flying experience possible but it
6:35
was flying more passengers and making
6:37
more money than ever through business
6:39
model still rather unique in the
6:41
American airline scene.
6:43
As with every airline in every country,
6:46
COVID was catastrophic for Spirit. A
6:49
near complete loss of revenue.
6:51
>> [music]
6:51
>> But where their fortunes truly shifted
6:53
relative to the rest was in the recovery
6:55
years. While other US airlines marched
6:58
back towards profitability, Spirit just
7:01
didn't. For some reason, an
7:03
industry-leading business model
7:05
pre-COVID just couldn't come back to
7:07
life after. But what the calamity of
7:09
COVID masked was the continued
7:11
progression of trends that were already
7:13
starting to put pressure on the airline
7:14
in the years before.
7:16
A strange thing had been happening.
7:18
Americans were increasingly choosing to
7:21
spend more to fly. It's not that people
7:24
wanted to pay more for the same product
7:26
but rather on average, passengers were
7:28
more frequently electing to pay for more
7:31
premium offerings. As the major US
7:33
airlines started to post profits again
7:35
post-COVID, they kept remarking in their
7:37
earnings releases that their economy
7:39
cabins were flat to down whereas premium
7:41
economy and business class were driving
7:43
their revenue growth. Airlines responded
7:45
to this by building more business class.
7:47
United unveiled a new 787 configuration
7:50
with just 20% of space allocated towards
7:52
standard economy, while JetBlue and
7:54
Frontier elected to roll out business
7:56
class cabins fleet-wide for the first
7:58
time. Explanations abound for this
8:00
phenomena, but the simplest and surest
8:02
is that Gen Z and Millennials are
8:04
representing a larger and larger portion
8:06
of spending power in America, and these
8:08
younger generations have always spent
8:10
disproportionately on experiences versus
8:12
physical goods. That includes travel,
8:15
which these generations allocate a
8:16
greater portion of their income to than
8:18
others, and with more money devoted
8:20
towards travel, that's more people who
8:21
elect to treat themselves to extra
8:23
legroom, premium economy, or business
8:25
class.
8:26
It used to be that premium seats, and
8:28
especially domestic premium seats, were
8:30
primarily purchased by business
8:32
travelers with expense accounts, and so
8:33
budget airlines, which are inherently
8:35
leisure-oriented, didn't have to worry
8:37
about premium offerings. Once this
8:39
premiumization trend emerged, Spirit's
8:41
primarily economy fleet had no way of
8:44
capturing the revenue upside, while it
8:46
also suffered a downside as some of the
8:48
trend manifested through travelers
8:49
electing to pay more for a full-service
8:51
airline rather than Spirit's bare-bones
8:53
offering. The low-cost market was
8:56
eroding.
8:57
But on top of that, Spirit's ability to
8:59
capture that tranche of the market was
9:01
eroding, too. Throughout the late 2010s,
9:04
Delta, American, and United each
9:06
progressively rolled out a new fare
9:08
class that they called Basic Economy.
9:10
Essentially, they just offered the same
9:12
as Spirit. Rock-bottom prices, but with
9:14
no bag, no seat selection, no refunds,
9:17
nothing included. [music]
9:19
The major airlines' pricing algorithms
9:21
would often match or nearly match
9:23
Spirit's fares in the market, but
9:24
[music] the big airline brand names
9:26
would win customers over thanks to a
9:28
perception of better service and
9:29
reliability. In the pre-COVID years,
9:31
this did not represent an existential
9:33
threat to Spirit, just a new dimension
9:35
of competition, but it did appear to
9:37
chip away at its profits. What was a
9:40
mid-20s operating margin in 2015 fell
9:42
[music] to low 10s by the time the first
9:44
coronavirus cases emerged in Wuhan. Just
9:47
as with the premiumization trend, this
9:49
momentum appeared to continue through
9:50
COVID, and by 2024, United, for example,
9:53
reported that basic economy now
9:55
represented 16% of its domestic
9:57
passenger base.
9:59
But, while this represented a slow
10:01
erosion of Spirit's financial moat, the
10:03
airline ran into far more acute issues,
10:05
as well. Back in 2016, Spirit became the
10:08
first US airline to acquire the brand
10:11
new A320neo. [music]
10:13
The aircraft's innovative Pratt &
10:14
Whitney PW1100G geared turbofan engines
10:17
burn about 16% less fuel than the
10:20
previous generation, and considering how
10:22
much Spirit used each one of its
10:23
aircraft, this led to some real cost
10:25
savings [music] during its lucrative
10:27
late 2010s years.
10:29
But, the engines had issues. Come summer
10:32
2023, Pratt & Whitney issued a recall
10:35
notice.
10:36
>> [music]
10:36
>> They discovered that for 6 years, their
10:38
factory in New York had been using
10:40
contaminated powdered metal to create
10:42
the blades for the engine's core. The
10:44
contamination was subtle enough that the
10:45
engines passed inspections and typically
10:47
flew perfectly fine, but while
10:49
operating, microscopic cracks were
10:51
forming far sooner than expected. This
10:54
is only known to have ever caused one
10:55
actual aircraft incident, and even that
10:58
only resulted in an aborted takeoff, but
11:00
if left unaddressed, as engines got
11:02
older, more failures would inevitably
11:04
follow.
11:05
>> [music]
11:05
>> So, regulators called for inspections of
11:07
about 1,200 potentially affected
11:09
PW1100Gs, and these inspections were far
11:12
from trivial.
11:14
Operators had to park their aircraft,
11:16
physically remove engines, then ship
11:17
them to one of only about 20 shops
11:19
worldwide qualified to undertake the
11:21
process. These shops would then
11:23
disassemble the engines, inspect each
11:25
and every blade using ultrasonic
11:26
devices, then replace affected blades.
11:29
All in, this process took upwards of 250
11:32
days and there was the dual constraint
11:34
of shop capacity and replacement blade
11:36
supply, meaning aircraft groundings went
11:38
on for years. At its peak, Spirit had to
11:42
park 40 of their A320neo family aircraft
11:45
and still pay for their lease costs.
11:47
With constraint on their aircraft
11:48
supply, the airline completely pulled
11:50
out of Boston and Cleveland and heavily
11:52
cut back on Dallas flying, leaving less
11:54
opportunity for them to dig themselves
11:56
out of their financial hole. While they
11:58
did get some compensation from Pratt &
12:00
Whitney, it was [music] far from enough
12:02
to make up for the financial loss.
12:04
Spirit wasn't alone in its financial
12:06
struggles post COVID. The same pressures
12:09
eating its profits were present across
12:11
all American low-cost airlines. As cash
12:14
reserves dwindled, they all scrambled
12:15
for solutions and some chose to turn to
12:18
the most tried and tested solve for
12:20
airline financial woes, consolidation.
12:23
On February 7th, 2022, Spirit announced
12:26
[music] its intention to merge with
12:28
Frontier. The two airlines operated near
12:31
identical business models, barebones
12:32
fares on leisure-oriented routes, and
12:34
even flew the same aircraft types,
12:36
making fleet integration simple. But
12:38
they were also different in the ways
12:39
that mattered. Frontier's network was
12:41
oriented more towards the west, while
12:43
Spirit focused on the east, Caribbean,
12:45
and South America. Only 18% of the
12:47
pair's routes overlapped, meaning
12:49
combined they could become a truly
12:51
nationwide mega ultra-low-cost carrier,
12:54
representing the fifth largest airline
12:56
in America. All that was left to make
12:58
the merger plan official was for
13:00
shareholders to vote on the matter, but
13:01
considering this was a board-approved
13:03
deal,
13:04
>> [music]
13:04
>> precedent suggested that this was all
13:05
but a formality. Precedent, however, was
13:08
wrong.
13:10
JetBlue had a different plan. They
13:12
submitted an offer to buy Spirit for $33
13:15
a share, far above the 25 or so dollars
13:18
per share the Frontier deal implied. On
13:20
paper, this was a far more valuable bid.
13:22
Regardless, Spirit's board responded
13:24
with this, "Our board has unanimously
13:27
determined that JetBlue's proposal does
13:29
not constitute a quote superior proposal
13:31
under Spirit's existing merger agreement
13:33
with Frontier. We believe a combination
13:35
of JetBlue and Spirit has a lower
13:37
probability of receiving antitrust
13:39
clearance. In short, Spirit's board
13:41
believed that even if they and their
13:43
shareholders agreed to the merger
13:44
proposal, the merger was unlikely to
13:46
happen as the Department of Justice
13:48
would sue to block it under the
13:49
provisions of antitrust law arguing that
13:51
it was harmful for consumers. Spirit had
13:53
good reason to believe this. The Biden
13:55
DOJ had earned a reputation as perhaps
13:57
the most aggressively anti-consolidation
13:59
administration of the 21st century. And
14:02
in fact, JetBlue had already been
14:04
targeted by this DOJ with a lawsuit to
14:06
stop its Northeast Alliance joint
14:08
venture with American Airlines.
14:10
Spirit's perspective was that the Biden
14:12
administration would consider the
14:13
potential consumer harm of a tie-up with
14:15
Frontier quite differently than one with
14:17
JetBlue. JetBlue, after all, is not an
14:20
ultra-low-cost carrier. It
14:22
definitionally fulfills some of the
14:24
criteria of a low-cost carrier, but
14:26
operates more of a hybrid model with
14:28
extra legroom, free Wi-Fi, business
14:30
class offerings, and even long-haul
14:32
routes to Europe. Their plan, if they
14:34
were to acquire Spirit, was to fold the
14:36
ultra-low-cost carrier into the JetBlue
14:38
brand and operate it the way JetBlue
14:40
operated, meaning the US airline market
14:42
would lose the price competition that
14:44
Spirit in its current form provided. In
14:46
the Frontier merger scenario, meanwhile,
14:48
two ailing ultra-low-cost carriers would
14:50
consolidate into a larger, stronger
14:53
competitor, potentially elevating their
14:54
competitive influence on the broader
14:56
market to a point greater than the sum
14:58
of their parts.
14:59
Shareholders, however, did not share the
15:01
concern. Spirit lacked the votes to
15:03
approve the merger, and so they kept
15:05
delaying and delaying and delaying the
15:07
vote. For months, a cycle emerged of
15:10
another delay, another tweak of terms by
15:12
Frontier and JetBlue, and another delay
15:14
until the writing was on the wall.
15:16
Shareholders wanted the JetBlue offer.
15:19
It was just too tantalizing.
15:22
And so, the board approved the JetBlue
15:24
merger, shareholders soon followed, and
15:26
the two airlines started the lengthy
15:27
process of preparing to close the
15:29
transaction. But then, as foretold, the
15:32
Department of Justice sued to stop the
15:34
merger on antitrust grounds. In fact, in
15:37
their original complaint, the DOJ cited
15:39
what Spirit itself said the DOJ would
15:41
say, that this was a, quote, "high-cost,
15:43
high-fare airline buying a low-cost,
15:45
low-fare airline, and that, quote, a
15:48
JetBlue acquisition will have lasting
15:49
negative impacts on consumers." The
15:51
facts were hard to argue with. Quote,
15:53
"JetBlue estimates that when Spirit
15:55
stops flying a route, average fares go
15:57
up by 30%." At trial, the airlines
16:00
argued that even if low-cost capacity
16:02
would be eliminated, the creation of a
16:03
more meaningful non-budget competitor to
16:05
Delta, United, and American would be
16:07
pro-consumer, and they offered
16:09
divestiture of key assets like slots and
16:11
gates to offset any remaining consumer
16:13
harm. Ultimately though, the odds were
16:15
never good. From the perspective of
16:17
antitrust law, it was about [music] as
16:19
slam dunk of a case as ever makes it to
16:21
trial. There was clear, objective
16:24
reduction of competition, so from the
16:26
point at which the DOJ decided to pursue
16:28
it, it appeared far likelier than not
16:30
that they were going to win, and so they
16:32
did. Spirit was right back to where it
16:35
started, yet with hundreds of millions
16:37
of dollars of cash and two years wasted.
16:42
In the aftermath, Spirit floundered
16:43
through various half-hearted solutions
16:45
to dig itself out of its hole. It
16:47
attempted to shrink to profitability by
16:49
cutting its fleet back to less than 100
16:51
aircraft, almost entirely pulling out of
16:53
the West, and instead refocusing on
16:55
shorter distance East Coast north-south
16:57
flying to vacation destinations. In
16:59
2023, they were burning about 1.2
17:01
million dollars in cash a day to keep
17:04
afloat. In 2024, this ramped up to 3.4
17:07
million dollars, and by 2025, it
17:09
spiraled yet further to 7.5 million
17:12
dollars in financial loss per day. The
17:16
airline went through multiple rounds of
17:17
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it rejected
17:19
another far weaker merger offer by
17:21
Frontier, and for most of 2025, it
17:23
perpetually sat on the precipice of
17:25
collapse. Yet, each time it looked
17:27
imminent, Spirit found another lifeline
17:29
to fund another few months of
17:30
operations.
17:32
But then the slow bleed was stopped by a
17:35
beheading. The Trump administration
17:37
attacked Iran, Iran retaliated by
17:39
closing the Strait of Hormuz, oil prices
17:41
spiked massively, and the airline's
17:42
single largest cost outright doubled.
17:45
The end was now inevitable. The business
17:49
had failed. Spirit had sunk, and the
17:52
best option for investors was to accept
17:54
reality and recover what [music] assets
17:56
they could. In the early hours of May
17:58
2nd, 2026, Spirit sent out its last
18:01
press release. 17,000 individuals lost
18:04
their jobs, and a 34-year legacy of safe
18:07
transport of almost half a billion
18:09
passengers came to an abrupt and
18:12
unceremonious end as the last yellow
18:14
Airbus touched down [music] at DFW.
18:17
When this end became inevitable is a
18:19
much debated question. There are plenty
18:22
of differing opinions on which decisions
18:25
could have altered this outcome.
18:26
>> [music]
18:27
>> In the reality where Spirit did
18:28
successfully merge with Frontier,
18:30
there's every world in which that would
18:31
have sunk both airlines. While
18:33
Frontier's post-COVID years were
18:34
comparatively better, they've still yet
18:36
to regain long-term profitability.
18:38
Similar to Spirit, they've been cycling
18:40
through various business model tweaks,
18:42
but there's not much in their financial
18:43
results to yet suggest they've found
18:45
their footing. While there's an argument
18:46
to be made that the consolidated larger
18:48
airline emerging from a merged Spirit
18:50
and Frontier could have competed its way
18:52
to profitability, the fact that almost
18:54
every American low-cost carrier, even
18:56
beyond the two, is still losing money
18:57
makes that incredulous.
19:00
Perhaps the more convincing argument is
19:01
that the Biden DOJ should have allowed
19:03
the JetBlue merger, even if the
19:05
antitrust case against it was strong.
19:07
Informed observers could understand all
19:09
the way back in 2023 that Spirit was
19:11
possibly on a path towards bankruptcy.
19:13
From the DOJ's perspective, the
19:14
counterfactual was Spirit remains
19:16
Spirit, when in reality, it was that
19:18
Spirit collapses. In retrospect, it
19:21
becomes fairly uncontroversial to say
19:23
that the better outcome would have been
19:24
for Spirit to consolidate into JetBlue,
19:26
saving thousands of jobs and creating
19:28
stronger competition against the majors.
19:30
Effectively, the Biden DOJ took a risk,
19:33
and the risk failed.
19:35
In any world though, Spirit could not
19:38
truly remain Spirit. The Spirit that
19:41
people love to hate, the rock-bottom
19:43
fare, Buzz Ball pedaling, bright yellow
19:45
airline for the masses, wasn't killed
19:47
off by the Biden DOJ or the
19:49
Trump-induced oil spike, or any single
19:51
action by anyone, because there was no
19:53
world in which the form the airline took
19:55
at its peak could continue into 2027 and
19:58
beyond. The American airline industry
20:00
had changed, and so Spirit's
20:02
ultra-low-cost model was as good as
20:05
dead, regardless of what mergers or
20:07
metamorphoses happened next.
20:10
In spite of Spirit's reputation among
20:12
passengers, it was undoubtedly good for
20:14
them. In a vast country with little
20:17
public transit, the airline enabled
20:19
movement for more by asking for less. It
20:22
brought people to family and friends,
20:24
births and deaths, weddings and
20:26
funerals, when it might not have
20:27
otherwise been financially possible. In
20:30
death, perhaps Spirit's strongest legacy
20:32
is the realization that as much as the
20:34
American air passenger loved to hate it,
20:37
they also hated to love it.
20:41
In research for this video, it quickly
20:43
became clear that mainstream news's
20:44
portrayals of the causes of Spirit
20:46
shutdown were often quite skewed and
20:48
incomplete. There was an enormous,
20:51
overwhelming amount of coverage, but it
20:52
was hard to know what was legitimately
20:54
useful information versus incomplete
20:56
facts trying to push a politicized
20:58
narrative. Right-leaning platforms would
21:00
attribute the shutdown on the Biden
21:01
administration's block of the JetBlue
21:03
merger, whereas left-leaning platforms
21:05
would deemphasize discussion of that
21:06
while focusing on how high fuel prices
21:08
caused by the Trump administration's war
21:10
in Iran pushed the airline carrier over
21:12
the edge. That's why I found our
21:13
sponsor, Ground News, to be a crucial
21:16
tool while writing this video. I've
21:18
partnered with them since 2023, and this
21:20
is why. Almost 600 sources covered the
21:22
Spirit Airlines story, and when I looked
21:24
on Ground News, I was able to quickly
21:26
see how each news outlet framed the
21:27
story. [music] Ground News is an app and
21:29
website that aggregates coverage of
21:31
particular news stories, source them
21:33
based on the political alignment of the
21:34
publisher, then allows you to compare
21:36
the way narratives differ between the
21:37
sides of the political spectrum. I know
21:39
that I tend to consume news sources that
21:41
align with my political bias, but that
21:43
even these sources tend to confirm my
21:44
biases by characterizing politicized
21:46
stories in a particular way. So, I find
21:48
Ground News helps a lot to figure out
21:50
what's an objective truth versus a
21:52
biased narrative. I also love that they
21:54
display the ownership for each
21:55
publication, and especially these days,
21:57
it's becoming more and more clear how
21:59
that can influence what publications
22:01
portray as the truth. And then another
22:03
feature I use is the blind spot feature,
22:05
which shows you stories that sources on
22:07
one side of the political spectrum are
22:08
talking about. I think it's fascinating
22:10
to see what certain groups of people
22:11
think is top news, while others don't
22:13
think about at all. And not only is this
22:15
interesting, but actually really
22:16
meaningful. A Duke University study on
22:18
polarization in media found that
22:20
exposure to news blind spots can
22:22
moderate political positions and reduce
22:23
polarization. Ground News is a fully
22:26
independent, subscriber-funded platform
22:28
designed for people who want to question
22:30
the narrative. So, if that sounds like
22:31
you, you can get 40% off unlimited
22:33
access to a Vantage plan, the same one I
22:36
use, by scanning the QR code on screen
22:37
or heading to the link in the
22:38
description, ground.news/wendover.
22:41
Signing up also helps support us at
22:42
Wendover, so thanks in advance if you
22:44
do.
